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— ABSTRACT —
One of the scientifically interesting questions is 
explaining the functioning and effectiveness of 
the minority government� An analysis of Polish 
governments (1989–2007) finds mixed support 
for the importance of parliamentary procedural 
mechanisms� Yet an analysis of the Polish govern-
ment after the collapse of communism reveals 
that a governing party with a central position in 
the party system can indeed shift alliances and 
maintain quite effective governance� Additionally, 
the evidence indicates that minority governments 
may also rely on alliances across parliament 
deputies who want prolong the term of office as 
long as possible� The article concentrates also on 
duration and legislative effectiveness of Polish 
minority cabinets�
Keywords: minority government (cabinet); 
political parties; legislation; effectiveness
— ABSTRAKT —
Jednym z  interesujących naukowo pytań jest 
wyjaśnienie funkcjonowania i  efektywności 
rządów mniejszościowych� Analiza polskich 
rządów w latach 1989–2007 potwierdza wpływ 
parlamentarnych mechanizmów i  procedur 
w  tym względzie� Analiza funkcjonowania 
polskich gabinetów rządowych po upadku komu-
nizmu pokazuje, że partia rządząca z centralną 
pozycją w systemie partyjnym może faktycznie 
zmienić sojusze i utrzymać całkiem skuteczne 
rządy� Dodatkowo wiele wskazuje na to, że rządy 
mniejszościowe mogą również polegać na soju-
szach między posłami do parlamentu, którzy chcą 
jak najdłużej przedłużyć kadencję� Artykuł kon-
centruje się także na długości funkcjonowania 
i skuteczności legislacyjnej polskich gabinetów 
mniejszościowych�
Słowa kluczowe: rząd mniejszościowy; partia 
polityczna; legislacja; efektywność
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INTRODUCTION
The comparative performance of distinct types of democratic government is 
at the heart of academic inquiry in political science� At one level, the discipline 
debates the advantages and disadvantages of parliamentary, presidential, and 
semi-presidential institutional structures� Within these macro-institutional 
categories, fundamental distinctions are made between single-party versus 
coalition governments and majority versus minority governments and their 
relative impact on government stability, legislative success and effectiveness, 
policy outcomes, and regime survival (Field, 2014, p� 298)�
This article focuses on minority parliamentary government in Poland, which 
is often deemed to be the most problematic form of parliamentary govern-
ment� An adequate understanding of the phenomena of minority governments 
in Poland must consider the fact that it was not an expected solution in the 
transforming state after the collapse of communism in 1989� As it is known, 
minority government comprises one or more parties that hold less than an 
absolute majority of the seats in the legislature� The frequency of minority 
government in Poland stands out in comparative perspective� Between the first 
not totally free post-communist elections in 1989 and the November 2007 elec-
tions, Poland had ten majority and eight minority governments (44,4 per cent)� 
If we additionally assume the criterion of division between left and right axis, 
then six of these mentioned cabinets were nominal right-wing offices, which 
constituted ¾ of all minority governments� It is also characteristic that the most 
minority governments (six out of eight) appeared after the adoption of the new 
Polish constitution in 1997� This is undoubtedly favored by the constitutional 
structure introduced during the adoption of the new Basic Law, which is the 
so-called constructive vote of no confidence, which protects the duration of the 
government not having sufficient political backing in parliament�
After 1989 in Poland there has been established parliamentary-governmental 
system, where legislative majorities have instruments at their disposal (such as 
no-confidence votes and investiture votes) and control the composition of the 
government and government policy� However, it should be stressed that the 
application of the majority principle to parliamentary responsibility is not alto-
gether straightforward� In Polish parliamentary regime, cabinets must at various 
junctures produce legislative majorities in order to perform their constitutional 
functions� Firstly, parliamentary governments ought to be able to win a vote 
of confidence� This type of vote can come in different forms according to their 
[24] Table 1. Governments (Cabinets) in Poland 1989–2007
No. Prime Minister
Political Parties Respon-
sible for Forming and 
Ruling the Cabinet
Period of 
Activeness
Durability 
of Cabinet 
in Months 
(Days)
Type of 
Cabinet
Time of 
Establi-
shing the 
Cabinet
1 Tadeusz Mazowiecki
at the beginning: PZPR, ZSL, 
SD; at the end: UD, PSL, SD, 
ROAD, FPD
12.09.1989–
04.01.1991 16 (430)
Cross-party 
Coalition -
2 Jan Krzysztof Bielecki KLD, PC, ZChN, SD
04.01.1991–
06.12.1991 11 (330)
Cross-party 
Coalition 10
3 Jan Olszewski PC, ZChN, PL, NSZZ „S” 06.12.1991–05.06.1992 6 (180)
Minority 
Coalition 17
4 Hanna Suchocka 
UD, ZChN, KLD, PL, PCD, 
SLCh, PPG
10.07.1992–
25.05.1993 10,5 (315)
Minority 
Coalition 10
5 Waldemar Pawlak SLD, PSL
26.10.1993–
07.03.1995 16 (480)
Majority 
Coalition 16
6 Józef Oleksy SLD, PSL 07.03.1995–07.02.1996 11 (330)
Majority 
Coalition 5
7 Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz SLD, PSL
07.02.1996–
31.10.1997 21 (630)
Majority 
Coalition 6
8 Jerzy Buzek AWS, UW 31.10.1997–07.06.2000 31 (930)
Majority 
Coalition 26
9 Jerzy Buzek AWS 07.06.2000–19.10.2001 16,5 (495)
Single-party 
Minority -
10 Leszek Miller SLD-UP, PSL 19.10.2001–04.03.2003 16,5 (495)
Majority 
Coalition 8
11 Leszek Miller SLD 04.03.2003–02.05.2004 14 (420)
Single-party 
Minority -
12 Marek Belka SLD 02.05.2004–31.10.2005 18 (540)
Single-party 
Minority 53
13 Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz PiS
31.10.2005–
27.04.2006 5,5 (165)
Single-party 
Minority 11
14 Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz PiS, LPR, SRP
27.04.2006–
14.07.2006 3 (90)
Majority 
Coalition -
15 Jarosław Kaczyński PiS, LPR, SRP
14.07.2006–
21.09.2006 2 (60)
Majority 
Coalition 6
16 Jarosław Kaczyński PiS, LPR
21.09.2006–
15.10.2006 1 (30)
Minority 
Coalition -
17 Jarosław Kaczyński PiS, LPR, SRP
15.10.2006–
11.08.2007 9,5 (285)
Majority 
Coalition -
18 Jarosław Kaczyński PiS
11.08.2007–
16.11.2007 4,5 (135)
Single-party 
Minority -
Source: own study based on information from official sites (www�premier�gov�pl, www�sejm�gov�pl)� 
Party names: AWS = Electoral Action Solidarity of the Right; KLD = Liberal Democratic Congress; LPR 
= League of Polish Families; PC = Centre Alliance; PCD = Party of Christian Democrats; PiS = Law and 
Justice; PL = Peasant Alliance; PO = Civic Platform; PPG = Polish Economic Programme; PSL = Polish 
Peasant Party; SLD = Democratic Left Alliance; SDPL = Polish Social Democracy; SRP = Self-defence 
of the Republic of Poland; UD = Democratic Union; UP = Union of Labour; UW = Freedom Union; 
WAK = Catholic Election Action; NSZZ “S” = Trade Union Solidarity, SD = Democratic Party; ZSL = 
United Peasants Party; ZChN = Christian National Unity; PZPR = Polish United Workers Party
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origins� Vote of confidence may be demanded by the government itself (usually 
any time the government requests it) or it may be required by the constitutional 
regulation (particularly at the time when a new government first presents itself 
to the legislature)� This necessity of winning vote of confidence is very often 
called by experts a viability requirement, because if such voting ends negatively, 
the government simply vanishes (Strøm, 1990, p� 5)�
Secondly, constitutional functions of government are also very often con-
nected with effectiveness, so it is obvious the governments must be both viable 
and effective� Such conditions are fulfilled by legislative coalitions which consist 
of the political parties from which the members of the governments are drawn� 
In coalition-theoretic parlance, the assumption are that the coalitions over policy 
and office are identical and that they can be identified as the parties holding 
cabinet portfolios�
The term government (cabinet) in Poland is most frequently understood 
as executive body enjoying the trust of the legislature, which in the basic law is 
simply called the Council of Ministers� An additional condition clarifying such 
a government is its specific political configuration, in other words, a single party 
or party coalition that manages the most important executive offices – the posi-
tion of the Prime Minister and ministers� In consequence we should remember 
that if there is a change in the Prime Minister position or a political configuration 
is being transformed by changing the coalition (e�g�, leaving or joining a new 
party) – we then have a completely new cabinet� Such argumentation, although 
very popular among political scientists and lawyers, is not the only one and one 
can also find a different thesis, according to which the criterion of changing the 
cabinet is associated only with a change in the position of the Prime Minister� 
For the purposes of this study, however, the most-chosen version was adopted 
by the constitutional experts, that one Prime Minister may lead several cabinets 
with different party compositions, and within the same political base several 
cabinets may function when the change takes place only in the Prime Minister 
position (Radek, 2009, p� 208)�
As it was mentioned above, minority government (cabinet) is most often 
characterized by experts as a cabinet formed in a parliamentary system when 
a political party or coalition of parties does not have a majority of overall seats 
in the parliament� It is sworn into office, with or without the formal support of 
other parties, to enable a government to be formed� Under such a government, 
legislation can only be passed with the support of enough other members of 
the legislature to provide a majority, encouraging multi-partisanship� However, 
26 ATHENAEUM
Polish Political Science Studies
vol. 63(3)/2019
majority or minority governments do not altogether exhaust the set of pos-
sible cabinet solutions� A further possibility is non-partisan solution, such as 
a caretaker or business administration� It also must be stressed that governing 
capacity is defined as the government’s ability to make significant, authoritative 
decisions regarding the country’s public policies� In that case, a legislative success 
most intuitively taps into the definition of governing capacity because it directly 
measures decision-making on public policies that must pass through parliament 
(Field, 2016, p� 78)� 
It should be remembered that many minority and some majority governments 
are precisely caretaker governments, however such distinguishing characteristic 
is not as important as nonpartisanship position of such cabinet� In the literature, 
many authors very often concentrate on single-party and coalition governments, 
and claim that they form under distinct conditions: single-party government in 
majority situations, when one party controls a majority of the legislature, and 
coalition government in minority situations, when no party is in power to control 
a majority of the legislature�
In parliamentary democracies both minority and nonpartisan governments 
are treated as a kind of deviation� Nonpartisan governments violate the most 
fundamental norm, that of party government (Sartori, 1976; Rose, 1974)� Minor-
ity governments violate the expectation that executive and legislative coalitions 
are the same coalitions and it is extremely difficult to say what would cause 
such distinction between them� Why would any party agree to support the 
government legislatively if it gets no portfolios in exchange? Also quite interest-
ing scientifically is finding the answer to the question why the opposition, by 
definition a majority coalition in parliament in that case, does not create the 
government and take the spoils of office for itself� These facts indicate that minor-
ity government is a counterintuitive phenomenon in the world of parliamentary 
democracies, where the expectation of majority government is conventionally 
understood as an axiom� Any occurrence of minority government therefore 
seems to threaten the entire edifice of deductive coalition theory� Given the 
counterintuitive nature of minority governments, the question is whether they 
can be as easily dismissed as nonpartisan administration (Strøm, 1990, p� 8)� 
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GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE IN POLAND
This section provides an assessment of the performance of minority govern-
ments in Poland between 1989 and 2007� It employs two standard indicators of 
government performance: government duration and legislative success� There 
could be also analysed, as Strøm (1990) stresses, third important indicator, which 
is governing party’s electoral performance in the subsequent election, but this 
element may broaden and extend the article too much, so the author resigns 
to unpack it� Two mentioned above indicators demonstrate that Polish minor-
ity governments outperform minority governments cross-nationally and that 
while Polish majority governments performed slightly better than minority ones 
between 1989 and 2007, as operationalised here, the differences are not great� If 
we eliminate first two governments of Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Jan Krzysztof 
Bielecki, there is little difference between minority and majority government per-
formance� There are also good theoretical reasons to only consider the post-1991 
period (this election was the first one fully democratic and free)� Most experts 
claim that Polish democracy was not consolidated until 1997, and some of the 
crucial institutional arrangements were developed in the 1997 Constitution of 
the Republic of Poland� In fact, the establishment of new Polish Constitution 
and changes in the party system helped to stabilise governments which has been 
protected by the normative regulations�
Using a definition of government termination that includes changes in the 
partisan composition of the cabinet, the Prime Minister, coalition status, or new 
elections (Lijphart, 1999), the average duration of all Polish governments form 
1989 till 2007 is not very long – 355 days or almost one year (see: Table 1)� This 
does not exceed the cross-national average cabinet duration of 2�12 years found 
in Lijphart’s study (1999, p� 137) of 36 democracies and is over two times lower� 
The average duration of Polish majority governments is 1,13 years (411 days) 
compared with 0,78 years (285 days) for minority ones� However, between 1989 
and 2007, the distance in duration of minority and majority governments in 
Poland was 0,35 years (126 days), which is roughly half of the minority govern-
ments durability time at all� Both statistics for cross-national average of 1�64 years 
for single-party minority governments in Lijphart’s research far exceed Polish 
minority governments (Lijphart, 1999, p� 137)� Polish minority governments last 
far shorter than their Western counterparts (average of 601 days) (Gallagher, 
Laver, & Mair, 2006, p� 410)� They also do not appear to have more difficulty in the 
formation process (see: Table 1)� On average, government formation for all types 
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takes in Poland only 9,33 days� There must be stressed a really small difference 
between the time necessary to establish minority and majority governments� 
On the one hand, majority governments are obviously formed faster and easier 
and this process lasts 7,7 days� On the contrary, the minority ones are formed 
longer, i�e�, 11,38 days, which is also not a symbol of crisis� It is even possible to 
claim that in Poland the minority or majority status of the government does not 
influence the time of establishing the government� In my opinion, this is probably 
caused by the underdeveloped party system in Poland and not the real political 
base in the parliament�
One of the main reasons that influenced the duration of minority govern-
ments in the analysed period 1989–2007 was the situation on the party scene 
and individual parliamentary members’ fears of earlier elections� It is worth 
noticing that parliament’s terms of office was shortened only once by the will 
of the parliamentary members, which happened in 2007� The decision was then 
enforced by the leader of Law and Justice – Jarosław Kaczyński� His strategy was 
obvious, i�e�, he wanted to avoid the uncomfortable situation for the government 
attacked by the opposition� However, after earlier election in 2007, the control 
of government was lost by Law and Justice, but still, in the long run, Jarosław 
Kaczyński avoided weak electoral results and was able to control the party scene 
in Poland�
The second performance indicator is the legislative success of the govern-
ments, measured by the percentage of government bills presented that are 
approved� Overall, Polish governments perform quite well in this sphere (see: 
Tables 2 and 3)�
The participation of the government in legislative proceedings has not only 
a practical dimension that influences the effectiveness of governance, but is also 
important from the point of view of the principle of legalism and other compo-
nents of the democratic state ruled by law� In a state that wants to be treated not 
only seriously, but also perceived as adhering to the rule of law, a political program 
can only be implemented through laws, especially where there is no government 
delegated legislation� In accordance with the imperative of cooperation of the 
legislature and the executive in this system, the act should be a joint work of the 
government and parliament, in this way that the government prepares projects, 
while the parliament adopts them, thus enabling the government’s key functions 
of ruling� In addition, the legislative aspect at the level of the European Union 
is an additional factor raising the rank of the legislative role of the government, 
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which is reflected in the construction of the EU decision-making process� The 
most characteristic feature of the EU legislative process is the conversion of the 
systemic roles of the legislature and the executive versus the classical division 
of power� This executive actually creates EU law with the participation of the 
parliament, and the member states’ parliaments possibly carry them out, when 
it takes the form of directives and controlling government representatives in the 
EU decision-making structures, while controlling the legislative process is in the 
interest of the national sovereign (Patyra, 2011, p� 122)� 
Currently, the existing constitutional solutions in Poland dedicate only a few 
normative instruments through which the Council of Ministers is able to influ-
ence the legislative process� These instruments include, first of all, the right of 
legislative initiative, which is widely recognized as an irreducible principle in the 
parliamentary-cabinet system, and the experience of Polish constitutionalism so 
far indicates that the government has always been an entity equipped with this 
right� Past experience shows also that the Council of Ministers is the most active 
entity among five equipped by the Constitution in this law� All bills submitted 
by the government are subject to specific formal requirements, including the 
obligation to consult, the obligation to draw up socio-economic effects related to 
the entry into force of the act, and the drafting of implementing acts (Mistygacz, 
2012b, pp� 117–118)�
In the case of the government, it must be stressed that the President, as the 
second part of the executive branch, is extremely important� The personal right 
of the head of state in the field of legislative initiative may in fact destabilize 
and conflict the dual executive, which unfortunately, may affect the quality 
of governance� Leaving aside the intentions of both the government and the 
President himself, it may occur that both sides will compete with each other 
and even deliberately interfere with the achievement of political goals� It can 
generate two extremely interesting situations� The first of these is the cohabita-
tion situation, and the second is the emergence of a minority cabinet� In both 
cases, and especially in the second one, presidential role in the political system 
and its impact on the legislative process can significantly increase� It is believed 
that some political elites in the destabilized parliament will strive to satisfy the 
alternative political centre, pursuing their particular interests�
As Table 2 shows, the dominance of the government over the President 
in the field of initiating legal acts is enormous and confirms the existence of 
a parliamentary-cabinet system in Poland� The role of the President is marginal 
here, which is indeed not surprising� 
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Table 2. Number of Bills Submitted in the Parliament (Lower Chamber) 
Term of Office
Number of submitted bills (legislative initiative)
Council of Ministers President Government projects among executive projects in per cent (%)
X (1989–1991) 144 6 96
I (1991–1993) 80 5 94,1
II (1993–1997) 334 15 95,9
III (1997–2001) 553 16 97,2
IV (2001–2005) 808 21 97,5
V (2005–2007) 377 23 94,3
Average 383 14 95,8
Source: own study based on information from official site – www�sejm�gov�pl, and Mistygacz, 2012a, 
p� 285�
The issue of legislative effectiveness of minority governments seems to be 
more interesting� In order to find and confirm the links between legislative effec-
tiveness and the functioning of minority cabinets, it is first necessary to provide 
aggregated data on this topic, presented in Table 3� The reader will also find 
there some data presenting the legislative effectiveness of other entities entitled 
to submit bills in the Polish parliament� The list of entities itself illustrates the 
dominance of government projects�
Table 3. Legislative Effectiveness of the Government in the Light  
of the Effectiveness of Other Entities 
Term of Office
Legislative Effectiveness in per cent %
Council of 
Ministers
Parlia-
mentary 
Members
Sejm’s 
Committees Senate President Citizens Average
X (1989–1991) 60 55 52 58 50 48 53,83
I (1991–1993) 55 24 31 20 20 15 28
II (1993–1997) 92 42 70 60 33 55 58,67
III (1997–2001) 81 41 78 41 31 40 52
IV (2001–2005) 91 51 82 64 71 38 66,17
V (2005–2007) 77 44 27 19 74 12 42,17
Average 76 42,83 56,67 43,67 46,67 34,67 -
Source: own study based on information from official site – www�sejm�gov�pl, and Mistygacz, 2012a, 
pp� 292–294; Dudzińska, 2015, p� 71�
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According to the Table 1 and Table 3, we can see a correlation that in the 
terms of parliaments I, III, IV and V, in which there were minority governments, 
the effectiveness of government legislation was smaller than in the second term 
in which the coalition majority government operated� Although in the fourth 
term of office, the success rate in adopting governmental projects was at a decent 
high level despite the existence of the government without the support of the 
majority, however, this condition was caused by the specific political situation 
strongly connected with the process of Poland’s accession to the European Union� 
During this period, legislative work aimed at adapting Polish law to the EU’s was 
intensified and the government as the participant of the process led the way in 
creating proposals and modifying normative solutions� It was a natural situation 
because governments are usually best-informed and substantively prepared in 
these matters� It should also be noted that in the period when only minority 
governments dominated (parliamentary terms 1991–1993 and 2005–2007), 
legislative effectiveness was definitely lower� The parliamentary term from 1997 
till 2001 was not only the time of preparations for Poland’s accession to the 
European Union but also numerous reforms of the political system, when the 
Prime Minister was Jerzy Buzek�
It should also be noted that minority governments were not able to push-
through any significant bills and the thesis about the administrative nature 
of such offices without a strategic vision of governance was confirmed� In the 
periods when the minority government was dominating in the executive, no 
major laws or projects were noted, so logically the existing solutions were not 
fundamentally remodelled� There was also a visible situation that number of 
projects approved by the cabinets were decreased especially at this time and in 
consequence there was a drop of average result for the whole parliament� One of 
the reasons for this situation was also the failure of the minority government to 
take such initiatives, which are often controversial in assumptions and for their 
success there is necessary the majority in the lower chamber of the parliament 
(Sejm)� There is no impact of normative solution here, which is the same as in 
the case of a government with a majority or only a minority background�
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CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion, based on the Polish experience, it is possible to confirm the 
hypothesis assumed in the introduction that the functioning of minority offices 
is not conducive to the legislative effectiveness of governments without a solid 
support in the parliament� In Poland, majority governments are a little bit more 
successful legislatively than minority ones� However, there was no big difference 
between majority and minority governments between 1989–2007 in durability 
and time necessary to establish a new cabinet� Not only the lack of the majority 
to pass laws, but also other internal factors may ultimately lead to the fall of 
the government and the shortening of the term of office, which results in the 
principle of discontinuation of parliamentary work� A separate issue requires 
further research to find an answer to the following question: who is the real 
author of realised projects? Finding an answer to the mentioned question is not 
an easy task�
In Poland, minority governments are also not legislatively less productive, as 
measured by the number of government-initiated laws passed� The difference 
largely occurs if we underline the accession to the European Union, which caused 
a higher number of laws, because parliament was engaged in building a new legal 
standardised system in Poland� 
To sum up, Polish minority governments perform as well as single-party and 
coalition majority governments in the post-1989 period� Even if we include the 
1989–1991 (not fully democratic parliament) data, minority governments do not 
significantly underperform compared with majority ones in Poland�
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